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Levels of Thought and Levels of Emotion
PHOEBE C. ELLSWORTH

I am not talking about unconscious emotions. If we have emotions that never ripple
the surface of consciousness, they are beyond the scope of this discussion. I am
talking about times when we are aware of emotional feelings, whether or not we can
give these feelings a name.
Even for conscious emotional states, I think it is impossible to specify a set of
minimal cognitive prerequisites. In some ways it is analogous to the attempt to
specify the defining features of mental illness. Some people are delusional but not
unhappy, some experience debilitating panic attacks even though they "know" there is
nothing to be afraid of, some are racked with physical pain that has no identifiable
physical cause. The history of attempts to define insanity in a way that bears some
relation to reality is testimony to the futility of seeking necessary and sufficient
causes.
Emotional experiences differ enormously in their degree of cognitive involvement. The emotional responses described by Clark Hull and those described by
William Shakespeare seem almost incomparable. An ambiguous noise many create a
sense of alert wariness, a smile or the sun breaking through the clouds may trigger
happiness without analysis, without signification, without thought (Zajonc, 1980). At
the opposite end of the spectrum we have Alexei Karamazov, Dorothea Brooke, and
Stephen Dedalus navigating in mental worlds of infinite cognitive and emotional
complexity, where any simple cognitive components have been transformed almost
beyond recognition.
If one defines emotion as beginning at the point of entry into the emotional
system, the contributing role of cognition will be less than if emotion is defined as the
full-fledged manifestation of an identifiable emotion 'such as anger or sorrow or
pride. Much of the debate about the role of cognition in emotion has been the result of
different definitions of the key terms.
My own view, similar to that of several other appraisal theorists, is that usually
the process of emotion (and I think of emotion as process) is initiated when one's
attention is captured by some discrepancy or change. When this happens, one's state
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is different, physiologically and psychologically, from what it was before. This might
be called a "state of preparedness" for an emotion, "alert attention," or the beginning
of emotion (cf. Ellsworth, 1991; Kagan, 1991, LeDoux, 1989). Whether one considers it the beginning of emotion or some pre-emotional state is largely a matter of
semantic preference. Viewing emotion as a process, I have no problem in defining
emotion from the moment the process begins. If others prefer to define it as the
moment the process results in the crystallization of the emotional (or pre-emotional)
experience into a relatively stable emotion that has a name, that's fine with me,
although not particularly interesting. It is the process that interests me. The process
almost always begins before the name and almost always continues after it. The
realization of the name undoubtedly changes the feeling, simplifying and clarifying.
Eventually, most human emotion involves cognition most of the time.
If the novel stimulus is easily defined as inconsequential, the physiological
response wanes, and the person typically moves out of the emotional system. If not,
further appraisals occur.
Appraisal theories (Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991c; Roseman, 1984;
Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) typically begin with very simple appraisals as
entry points into the realm of emotions: attention or novelty; a primitive sense of
pleasure or aversion; a sense of uncertainty or certainty. Further appraisals are
progressively more complex: the perception of an obstacle; a sense of control or lack of
it; attribution of agency-was the event caused by oneself, someone else, or impersonal
circumstances; legitimacy (Roseman, 1984); evaluation of the match between an event
and prevailing social norms or one's own personal standards (Scherer, 1984).
One's answer to the question of minimal cognitive prerequisites depends on one's
definition of cognition and on one's definition of emotion (as abundantly illustrated
by the debate between Zajonc and Lazarus; see Scherer & Ekman, 1984). If sensory
information processing is considered cognitive, then most if not all emotions will
show some "cognitive" contribution. If one defines cognition as involving conscious
propositional analysis, then a larger proportion of emotional experiences will be
defined as noncognitive, at least at their onset.
We have found that attention, pleasantness, certainty, anticipated effort or obstacle, and attributions of agency reliably discriminate 13 different emotions, and that
appraisals along some of these dimensions are especially important or central for
some emotions- uncertainty for hope and fear, and agency for sadness, anger, and
guilt, for example (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988). We hypothesize that these appraisals are extremely common in the process of emotion, both
within and across cultures. There may be other appraisals that are equally common;
we do not claim that our initial efforts have produced an exhaustive list. At least some
of these appraisals are associated with characteristic facial movements (Smith, 1989);
perhaps all of them have recognizable physical manifestations. There are undoubtedly additional less common appraisals that affect emotion, some that occur in some
cultures or classes of individuals but not others (Lutz & White, 1986; Ellsworth, in
press), perhaps some that are culturally or individually idiosyncratic.
I think emotion is usually provoked by_ appraisals (including remembered appraisals) of the environment, and one's self in relation to the environment, and I
believe the cognitive dimensions of appraisal we have found are likely candidates for
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very general, if not absolutely "necessary" cognitive components. There are, however, some situations that have been proposed as evidence against the proposition that
there are any cognitive prerequisites to emotion. I will briefly consider four of these,
two red herrings and two that raise real questions about the necessity of cognition for
emotion. This list is not exhaustive either.

Two Red Herrings

1. Emotions at ,the Movies
People scream and gasp at horror movies, cheer when the underdog clobbers the evil
power, cry when the lady dies bravely. If you ask people whether what is happening
on the screen is really happening, most of them will look at you askance and say, "Of
course not!" (The intellectuals will ask what you mean by "real.") Cognitively, they
"know" that no one was hurt, that the monster was just a special effect, yet their
emotions seem real. Their own well-being was never at stake; they do not need to
cope with the perils before them; they are sitting in chairs in a comfortable environment surrounded by other people sitting in chairs. How can they be experiencing
emotion if they lack the essential cognitive appraisals?
I do not think the emotions evoked by obviously fictional presentations contradict
the logic of appraisal theories. One of the essential functions of emotion is to motivate
the organism to respond quickly and effectively to environmental threats as they
arise. Generally the costs of failing to respond soon enough are far greater than the
costs of responding when it is not really necessary. Running away from an imaginary
danger or taking needless extra precautions may waste one's time or make one look
foolish, but standing there trying to decide whether or not the danger is real can cost
one's life. It is far safer for an organism to be calibrated to feel emotion when it is not
warranted- to have a hypersensitive system - than it is to have a system that postpones
the initiation of emotional processes until there is no question that they are justified.
Thus the emotions we feel in the movies are real. The events on the screen trigger
processes that are initially identical, or at least highly similar, to those triggered by
real events. The "higher cognition" that we are not in danger, that the events are not
real, comes into play only after the process has been set in motion, modifying the
experience and inhibiting the associated action tendency.
In young children the imbalance between the force of the immediate emotional
response and the knowledge that the events on the screen are fictional is even greater.
Young children often shout advice to the characters ("Not the ~st Wing! That's
where the Beast is!"), and sometimes do try to run out of the theater when the monster
appears. The emotions produced by an emotionally significant stimulus take precedence over the recognition that the stimulus is make-believe.

2. The Zajonc "Feelings Are First" Hypothesis
Likewise, I see no fundamental incompatibility between Zajonc's claim that "preferences need no inferences" and the claims of appraisal theories. The kinds of
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preference Zajonc discusses are immediate, automatic approach or avoidance tendencies that can occur even before the object is recognized and named. These
preferences seem to correspond quite closely to the very simple appraisal of valence
that characterizes several versions of appraisal theory. Nothing in appraisal theory
says that an object must be recognized before a sense of pleasure or aversion can
be felt.
From my point of view, Zajonc has engaged in extensive study of one of the basic
and most important steps in the process, usually (though not necessarily) a very early
step. Further appraisals-of obstacles, of control or coping potential, of agencycreate emotions that are more differented than the simple sense of valence. Zajonc
himself is quite clear on this point: "Of course, more complex emotions [more
complex than "simple affective polarities"], such as pride, disappointment, jealousy,
or contempt obviously require extensive participation of cognitive processes" (Zajonc, Murphy, & Inglehart, 1989).

Two Real Problems

1. Music
Explaining emotional responses to instrumental music is a real problem for appraisal
·theories, and may be a real threat to the generality of appraisals as elicitors of
emotion. Appraisal theories can account for some emotional responses to music, as
attention and valence certainly occur in listening to music just as they do in responding to other stimuli. The other appraisals that have been proposed-appraisals such as
certainty, control, and agency-seem less relevant to music than they are to other
kinds of events. Nonetheless, many people report responses to music that are far
more elaborate than a simple sense of pleasure or displeasure. Casual research in our
laboratory indicates that people can categorize their responses to musical selections
as "sad," "fearful," "triumphant," and "happy" with fairly high levels ofreliability,
and as "angry" with somewhat lower levels. Some subjects, along with many writers
(cf. Forster, 1939) struggle to communicate extraordinarily complex emotional
"meanings" of musical selections.
I do not think that these responses can be accounted for by appraisals ofthe music;
therefore, in this context, stimulus appraisals do not cause the emotion. But the same
patterns of appraisals may still be experienced as part of the emotion, even if their
causal role is delayed, muted, or nonexistent. Although I believe that emotions are
usually the result of a sequence of appraisals, they are not simply a combination of
cognitions. Instead, the appraisals have physiological and experiential correlates
(Smith, 1989), which together with the appraisals themselves, are the emotional
experience. Some of these physiological and experiential sensations may correspond
to features of music such as crescendo and decrescendo (as suggested by Tomkins,
1963), staccato and legato, tempo and rhythm, ascending and descending scales.
Musical phrases or longer excerpts that mimic the nonverbal, noncognitive aspects of
an emotional feeling state may elicit aspects of the emotion itself, then at last the full
emotion, including the characteristic appraisals (but not the action tendencies). The
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order of events is not the standard order described in the model, and the appraisals are
not appraisals of one's own immediate circumstances, of course. Instead they are
more generalized appraisals-without specific objects-appraisals ofloss and uncontrollability, of uncertainty, or of power and self-agency.
This hypothesis suggests the possibility of cross-cultural commonalities in the
ability of certain kinds of music to elicit certain emotionally relevant physiological
responses. Alternatively, the emotional response to music and the associated appraisals may be learned within particular cultures. I know of no cross-cultural
research on perceptions of the emotional tone of music.

2. Opponent Processes
Richard Solomon (1980) proposed an Opponent Process theory of emotion, in which
the termination of one emotion (e.g., joy) automatically brings about the onset of the
opposite emotion (e.g., sadness). Solomon's own research was largely concerned
with heart-rate acceleration in frightened dogs, followed by pronounced deceleration
below baseline when the fear stimulus was removed; the initial arousal was attenuated over many episodes, while the rebound effect was exaggerated. Speculating
about the applicability of the theory to humans, he cited studies of novice parachute
jumpers who experience a nightmare of panic and near incontinence before their first
few jumps, followed by relief, compared to experienced jumpers, who are barely
aroused before jumping, but experience an exhilarating "high" after they land.
Research on humans is sparse and usually flawed. Mauro (1988), however, in an
elegant series of studies, has provided evidence that opponent "rebound" effects do
occur in humans, at least for some emotions, and cannot easily be accounted for by
changes in the person's appraisal of the situation. If such rebound effects prove to be
reliable, they constitute a second challenge to the generality of appraisal theories,
since the second, "rebound" emotion is caused only be the termination of the first and
not by any new appraisals.
Let me close with a gentle reminder. Music and opponent processes are problematical for appraisal theories of emotion, but no other theories have done much better.
The usual tactic is simply to omit any reference to these embarrassing mysteries, to
rule out domains where our theories falter as irrelevant or ''beyond the scope of the
present paper." Nonetheless, the mysteries are the theoretical challenges, and sooner
or later must be acknowledged.

